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Metaphyics as a Basis for Deep Ecology: An Equiry into 
Spinoza’s System
Abstract: Recently, Deep Ecology has gained a new impetus 
because of the current state of affairs threatening the planet 
and because of intellectual changes in the field.  One of these 
crucial intellectual changes came about as theorists gained a 
better understanding of what Naess meant by the concepts 
‘Deep Ecology’ and ‘ecosophy’ in his talk in Bucharest  in 1972 
– the first part  will focus on this.  The second part will focus 
on the use by Deep Ecology supporters of Spinoza’s 
metaphysical system as a foundation to their own views, and 
it identifies problems and proposes solutions through an 
alternative reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics, especially his 
concepts of monism and conatus.  
METAPHYSICS AS A BASIS FOR DEEP ECOLOGY: AN 
ENQUIRY INTO SPINOZA’S SYTEM
A Brief Characterization of Deep Ecology
The twentieth century was a crucial one for the field of 
Environmental Ethics.  In 1949, Aldo Leopold published A Sand 
County Almanac and specifically the chapter “The Land Ethic”, a 
landmark on environmental thinking that advocates harmony 
between human beings and the environment as well as the 
enlargement of the moral sphere. This represented a departure 
from traditional anthropocentric philosophical thinking.  The next 
milestone was reached in 1962 when Rachel Carlson published her 
book Silent Spring, revealing the toll that agricultural pesticides, 
such as DDT, were taking on animals, plants, ecosystems, and 
human health.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the first few 
articles focusing on environmental issues appeared in philosophy 
journals, and the first books, conferences, and courses in colleges 
and universities. 
It was around this time, in the early days of development of modern 
environmental thinking, that Arne Naess proposed in 1972 the 
terms ”Deep Ecology” and “ecosophy”  in a talk in Bucharest (cf. 
Naess 1973).   In this talk, Naess contrasted Deep Ecology with 
Shallow Ecology.  The term “Shallow Ecology” stands for an 
environmental ethics that remains anthropocentric because it only 
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seeks to be normative and, as such, it does not inspire a change in 
the way people perceive the world around them - it only seeks to 
guide human action.  By  contrast Deep Ecology  defends the 
position that a change of perspective and attitude is required.  
For reasons of historical authenticity, it is worth referring to some of 
the early definitions of Deep Ecology as a way of demonstrating 
theorists’ understanding of the term at the time. These early 
definitions are in direct contrast with more contemporary 
understandings of the term, and this is something that will become 
evident below.  Fox (1984:204) explained his understanding of 
Deep Ecology in his paper "On Guiding Stars for Deep Ecology":
In seeking to change the way in which we experience 
the world (i.e. our state of being), deep ecologists 
place their primary emphasis upon changing our 
'underlying perception of the way things are...rather 
than upon what we might term the 'conceptual fix' 
approach of 'bigger and better' ethics (in the sense of 
arguments that ultimately issue in particular codes of 
conduct...)  
And Kohac (1997:159) provides another, similar definition of Deep 
Ecology in his "Varieties of Ecological Experience":
[Deep Ecology] sees the root of our environmental 
problem in our own conception of the place of 
humans in nature.
Such an understanding led to the following criticisms being raised 
against Deep Ecology. Firstly, the divide between Shallow Ecology 
and Deep Ecology is sometimes very tenuous; secondly, a debate 
exists as to whether Deep Ecology is, or would be, effectively 
practical since it does not primarily  seek to be normative but to 
change our perception of reality.  Needless to say  that these were 
very  serious criticisms, which have hindered Deep Ecology’s 
progress.  For instance, Godfrey-Smith (1980:24) says that “deep 
ecology...has an unfortunate tendency to discuss everything at 
once.  Thus a social critique of deep ecology may be backed by 
such disparate authorities as Ginsberg, Castenada, Thoreau, 
Spinoza, Buddhist visionaries, and Taoist physics.  With a cast of 
prima donnas like this on stage it is very hard to follow the script”. 
And Ecofeminists such as Plumwood (1991:13) argue that “The 
problem...is the discontinuity  between humans and nature that 
emerges as part of the overall set of Western dualisms. Deep 
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ecology proposes to heal this division by a "unifying process," a 
metaphysics that insists that everything is really part of and 
indistinguishable from everything else. This is not only  to employ 
overly powerful tools but ones that do the wrong job, for the origins 
of the particular opposition involved in the human/nature dualism 
remain unaddressed and unanalyzed”. 
Recently, however, Deep Ecology has gained a new impetus for 
two reasons.  The first reason is an obvious one and it is connected 
to the current state of affairs that threatens the planet.  Humanity 
has spread itself all over the planet and has interfered greatly with 
the environment through the exploitation of natural resources, 
pollution of the earth, air and water, and through the required 
changes for turning environments into suitable milieus for human 
use as dwellings, agricultural land, sources of energy and so on 
and so forth (cf. Linkola 2009:169)  The outcome of this extreme 
interference with our environment has led the scientific community 
to raise the alarm that the rich biodiversity  of our planet is at risk, 
that there can be some climate and environmental changes that 
may lead to serious consequences to human beings and to the 
other forms of life on the planet, and that the exploitation of natural 
resources at current levels is unsustainable and will lead to a 
complete depletion of resources. (cf Boff 2007:93-99; Scherer 
2009; Cobb 2009) 
The second reason for this new impetus happened at the 
intellectual level as commentators realized that their understanding 
of Deep Ecology was mistaken and that they  had misinterpreted 
Naess.  This intellectual change and the clarification of Naess’ 
views are still sifting through the literature and reaching the wider 
academic community (cf. Drengson and Devall’s (2008) paper 
“Deep Ecology Movement and Related Topics”, and Naess (1992) 
“The Three Great Movements”).  According to this more 
enlightened understanding Deep Ecology is to be understood as 
one of the three great social movements of modern times, along 
with the peace movement, the social justice movement, and the 
environmental movement.  People from all walks of life and 
backgrounds are franchised to these movements.  As such, when 
Naess introduced the term “Deep Ecology” he was characterizing a 
social movement that bore great importance in modern times and 
he was not putting forward a particular ethical theory or philosophy, 
as various commentators held for some time.  The heart of the 
problem lies in the fact that commentators were conflating the term 
Deep Ecology with Naess’ ecosophy T and therefore when Naess 
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contrasted Deep and Shallow ecology in his talk in Bucharest in 
1972 he was only contrasting two different approaches of 
environmental concern.  In a later article, Naess provides a number 
of practical examples contrasting the Shallow Approach to 
Environmental issues to the Deep  Approach, and for matters of 
illustration it is worth referring to one of these examples here, such 
as the one concerning pollution.  Naess (2009:266) qualifies the 
Shallow and Deep Approaches to pollution as:
Shallow Approach: Technology seeks to purify the air 
and water and to spread pollution more evenly.  Laws 
limit permissible pollution.  Polluting industries are 
preferably exported to developing countries.
Deep Approach: Pollution is evaluated from a 
biospheric point of view, not focusing exclusively on 
its effects on human health, but rather on life as a 
whole...The priority is to fight the deep causes of 
pollution, not merely the superficial short-range 
effects.
Therefore, Deep Ecology must be understood as a social 
movement with deep concern for the environment.  Directly 
connected to this is the term “ecosophy.”  The term ecosophy  refers 
to a life philosophy that drives people to join up  or take part in the 
Deep Ecology  movement.  Strictly speaking, there could be as 
many life philosophies as people; that is, a person’s culture, 
religion, life history, philosophical views, and the environment itself 
will play a part in how a person forge’s his or her own life 
philosophy.  Certainly, some common general principles would 
underlie all these life philosophies, and these are encapsulated in 
the well-known Deep Ecology eight-point platform (cf. Sessions 
1984).  Naess presented his own ecosophy, and he called it 
ecosophy T.  The T in ecosophy T stands for the mountain of 
Tvergastein, where Naess had a mountain hut and where he spent 
much of his time working out his ecosophy T, but Naess did not 
advocate that his ecosophy T was right for everyone.  Each 
individual should develop his or her own ecosophy and will join the 
Deep Ecology movement on the basis of this personal philosophy 
of life.  
It is perhaps appropriate here to refer to Naess’ apron diagram, 
which is presented in a simplified form by  Drengson (2007), and 
which helps considerably in clarifying the distinction between Deep 
Ecology as a movement and ecosophy as a life philosophy:
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Level I ! Ultimate Life Philosophies! ! Taoism, Ecosophy 
T
Level II! Movement Platform Principles! Peace Movement, 
DEM
Level III! Policy Formulations!! ! A, B, C, etc.
Level IV ! Practical Actions! ! ! w, x, y, etc. 
At level I people have or forge their own life philosophies, be this 
something like an ecosophy, or Christianity, or Buddhism, etc. 
Their life philosophies franchise them to a grassroots social 
movement, such as the peace movement, social rights movement 
or deep ecology movement, and this occurs at Level II.  At Level III 
those social movements help  with the formulation of policies, such 
as through lobbying, and at the ultimate level, Level IV, practical 
actions take place, like. buying eco-friendly  or carbon-neutral 
produce.
As a direct consequence of this we should not be using terms such 
as “Deep Ecologist”, rather, we should use “Deep Ecology 
supporter”.  Drengson (1999) notes that for Naess and others 
someone who accepts the principles of the Deep Ecology 
Movement principles is a “supporter” of the movement, not a “deep 
ecologist” as “Naess feels that “deep ecologist” is too immodest, 
and “shallow ecologist” is unkind language”. 
Spinoza and Deep Ecology
Deep Ecology  supporters, such as Naess (1977, 1978, 1981), 
Mathews (1988, 1991), Jonge (2004), Fox (1990) Devall and 
Sessions (1985) have sought in some of Spinoza’s views support 
for their own personal ecosophies.  And these theorists have 
developed their own particular personal ecosophies by  privileging 
different aspects of Spinozism and combining these aspects with 
other philosophical perspectives and strands.  However, there are 
some particular themes that are common to all these ecosophies. 
These themes are: i. intrinsic value, which could be defined as the 
view that everything has a !value in itself and this value is not 
dependent on usefulness to human ! beings; i i . biocent r ic 
egalitarianism, which could be defined as the view that all entities, 
whether a cell, an entity, or an ecosystem such as the Amazon 
Basin or the planet Earth, have equal value; iii. self-realisation, 
which could be defined as the view that every  thing seeks to self-
realize itself, however self-realization is understood, such as 
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enduring for as long as it possibly  could and/or as fulfilling its own 
purpose.  
Deep Ecology  understands that Spinoza’s metaphysics provide 
support for those three themes underlying its core principles, 
namely intrinsic value, egalitarian biocentrism and self-realisation. 
Spinoza’s monism provides support for the Deep Ecology 
supporter’s views on intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism 
and Spinoza’s thesis of conatus provides the cornerstone for the 
Deep Ecology supporter’s views on the importance of self-
realization.  It is through these three themes that Deep  Ecology 
supporters seek a change in human attitudes towards other entities 
in the universe, towards ecosystems, the planet and the universe 
itself.  This change of attitude aims at rejecting anthropocentrism 
either as the notion that either grants human being with an 
unwarranted dominion over the rest of reality, or/and upholds the 
view that human beings are superior to the rest of reality. 
This may appear strange to those not greatly acquainted with 
Spinoza’s work or who have not truly grasped the spirit of his 
philosophy, and as a question could be asked here: how can a 
metaphysician from the 17th century provide support to the modern 
philosophical field of Deep  Ecology?  Deep Ecology supporters 
understand that given the nature of the universe, and given the 
nature of things in the universe, a particular kind of attitude is 
appropriate.  That is to say, given that everything is a mode of the 
substance, given that everything, including human beings, are a 
modification of God or Nature, given that everything is 
interconnected, human beings should treat with an attitude of 
reverence the other modes of creation.  Some of Spinoza’s 
commentators, such as Lloyd (1980, 1994:155-158) question such 
readings of Spinoza referring to the tension between Spinoza’s 
understanding of human beings as part of nature and of morality as 
directly connected to what constitutes the good for human beings; 
particularly problematic for the field of environmental ethics is 
Spinoza’s rejection of animal rights as Lloyd (1994:155-156) notes:
His [Spinoza’s] stress on a relation of integration 
rather than separatedness between human beings 
and the rest of nature does not yield any repudiation 
of the exploitation of animals...In relation to animals, 
we should consider our own advantage, use them at 
our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient 
for us (ivP37S1).  But this approval for dominance is 
very  differently based from Descartes’s....Spinoza’s 
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version of dominance is...strongly  connected on the 
recognition of difference...it is the differences that 
justify their [animals] exclusion from our moral 
concerns, our moral community...what is most useful 
to us is other human beings, living according to the 
guidance of reason (ivP35C2).  The rational principle 
demands that human beings join forces with one 
another, not with the lower animals whose nature and 
affects do not agree with ours (ivP37S1).  “Both the 
horse and the man are driven by a Lust to procreate; 
but the one is driven by an equine Lust, the other by  a 
human Lust.  So also the Lusts and Appetites of 
insects, fish, and birds must vary” (iiiP57S).       
However, in reply to commentators such as Lloyd Naess (1980) he 
asserts that the complexities of Spinoza’s doctrines makes it 
difficult, if not a mammoth task, for any philosophical movement to 
make full use of him as a patron but this does not mean that 
Spinoza’s views may serve as “inspirations”.  In fact, Naess asserts 
that even if Spinoza himself could be said to be a Speciesist and 
devoid of environmental concern for animals and landscapes, that 
the complexities of his system do indeed entail the sort of 
environmental activism, concern and respect advocated by Deep 
Ecology.      
Despite these contrasting views in Spinoza’s scholarship  I think it is 
fair to say that Spinoza must have been aware of the fact that 
metaphysics has implications for ethics, otherwise why would he 
call his major work, which is a substantial metaphysical work, the 
Ethics?  Let me rephrase this: why should a work that discusses 
substance, attributes, modes, in short, a work that discusses the 
nature of reality be entitled the Ethics if Spinoza did not hold the 
view that the nature of reality impinges on morality?  
The central point of Spinoza’s Ethics is his argument in favour of 
monism.  That is, his theory that only one substance exists and that 
God or Nature (Deus sive Natura) is a substance, and that 
everything is a modification of the substance.  The thesis 
“everything is a modification of the substance” implies that the 
substance is to be understood as the totality of all forms of Being 
as well as being the highest form of Being.  Prima facie, given that 
according to Spinoza everything is a modification of the substance 
and given that the substance is God or Nature then one can infer 
that the substance does not hold any  sort of preference towards its 
modifications, because if the substance held any form of 
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preference towards any of its modifications it would be ascribed 
with a humanity that is alien to it.  In fact, Spinoza holds that from 
the perspective of the substance nothing has value (cf. Appendix to 
Part I of the Ethics) as value is something that only exists from the 
perspective of the modifications of the substance; that is, only a 
mode can value another mode as something that increases its 
capacity to exist for as long as it possibly could (i.e. conatus), e.g. a 
human being valuing water or food as something necessary for its 
own existence.  From the perspective of the substance it does not 
matter if its modifications are varied and include human beings or if 
its modifications are, say, all slugs.  
However, Deep  Ecology supporters seem to have chosen to ignore 
this aspect of Spinozism, that is, that the substance ascribes no 
value; and as a consequence of this Deep  Ecology argues that 
from the perspective of the substance all its modifications possess 
the same value or standing, each modification possesses an 
intrinsic value in so far as they are all modifications of the 
substance, and this value is not in any way connected to their 
usefulness to human beings.  Hence all modifications possess an 
equal intrinsic value because the substance holds no preference 
towards its modifications, all modifications count as the same.  If 
the substance were to ascribe more value to one of its 
modifications than to others then the substance would be 
incoherent – it would become anthropomorphic.  
The Deep  ecology supporter’s thesis of biocentric egalitarianism is 
derived from the thesis of intrinsic value; that is, given that all living 
modifications of the substance have an equal intrinsic value then all 
living entities, from a slug to a human being count as the same. 
Once again (and just as in the case of the substance holding no 
value), from the point of view of the substance it makes no 
difference if the universe is inhabited by slugs or amoebas or by 
rational entities like human beings.  This is a very contentious claim 
and I shall come back to it below.   
An important implication could be drawn here.  Given that 
everything is a modification of the substance (i.e. God or Nature), 
then everything should be treated with some sort of reverence by 
human beings because they are modifications of the substance just 
as human beings are.  It is from such a reading of Spinoza’s 
monism that the Deep Ecology supporter infers his thesis of self-
realization, which he then ground in Spinoza's thesis of conatus. 
The Deep Ecology supporter understands that everything should 
be able to self-realize itself, should be able to fulfil itself, its 
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purpose, its essence because everything is a mode of the 
substance, because the substance is ambivalent towards its 
modes.  I will come back to the issue of self-realization below but 
before doing so I wish to refer to the following quote from Devall 
and Sessions (1985:67) where they explain wel l the 
interconnection between intrinsic value, biocentric egalitarianism 
and self-realization:
The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in 
the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom 
and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding 
and self-realization within the larger Self-Realization. 
This basic intuition is that all organisms and entities in 
the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are 
equal in intrinsic value. 
The Deep  Ecology supporter’s notion of self-realization is directly 
connected to Spinoza’s thesis of conatus, the thesis that every 
modification aims at enduring as it is for as long as it possibly can. 
Deep Ecology supporters have interpreted Spinoza’s thesis of 
conatus as asserting that one should be able to fulfil oneself, as 
being able to fulfil one’s telos, one’s purpose (cf. (3P6) “everything 
in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own being”; and 
(3P7) “the endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its 
being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing”).  It is 
interesting to note here that Spinoza holds that all modifications of 
the substance have a conatus, that is, all modifications of the 
substance aim at striving for as long as they  possibly can as they 
are.  And this leads Deep  Ecology supporters to hold that all 
entities should be able to seek fulfilment, and here some would 
include everything, even ecosystems, mountains, the planet etc. 
(see for instance Lovelock’s Gaia theory; Lovelock 1987; 1988). 
Following from this, Deep Ecology supporters affirm that human 
beings should interfere as little as possible with the self-realization 
of these other entities, because everything should be able to self-
realize itself because everything has an intrinsic value and all life is 
held to be equal in value.  The Deep Ecology supporter’s argument 
can be summarized as follows: 
(Proposition A) because it is in every entity's nature to strive to 
remain as it is for as long as it possibly could;
(Proposition B) and given that every entity has an intrinsic value 
and since all entities are equal in value (from slugs and amoebas to 
human beings, from mountains and rivers to whole ecosystems);
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(Conclusion from A+B) then it follows that every  entity should be 
able to strive for as long as it possibly  could, and should be able to 
fulfill its essence.
Two questions are often raised against this argument.  The first 
question is: what qualifies as “little as possible”?  The Deep 
Ecology supporters’ answer here is always vague and as such 
faces a great deal of criticism.  The second question is: should 
everything be able to fulfil itself? What about a virus that has the 
potential to kill all humanity?  The Deep ecology supporter has two 
strategies in dealing with this question: the supporter will either 
avoid dealing with it or will rely  on vagueness (cf. Bookchin 1988; 
Hargrove 2009: 181-183; and perhaps most interesting Naess 
2009:271-273)
Criticisms to the Current Scenario in Deep Ecology
Questions could be asked concerning the Deep Ecology 
supporter’s interpretation of Spinoza’s thesis of substance and 
conatus.   If we ignore the obvious textual evidence from Appendix 
of Part I of the Ethics where Spinoza asserts that the substance 
can hold no value, then it could be questioned whether the 
substance would indeed be so impartial, whether it would value an 
amoeba just as much as it values a human being; and connected 
to this, it could also be questioned whether all entities should be 
able and enabled to fulfill themselves, to pursue their telos, to strive 
and endeavour for as long as they possibly  could.  What happens 
when there is conflict between the conatus of one mode and of 
another mode? What happens when an entity’s striving to remain 
as a unity for as long as it could jeopardizes the striving of another? 
What happens, for instance, when the conatus of a virus conflicts 
with the conatus of its host human being?  These are important 
questions that require some attention not merely for a better 
understanding of Spinoza but also for the field of Deep Ecology.
It is certainly true that Spinoza’s substance is the basis of all reality, 
and that everything is a modification of the substance.  It is also 
true that the substance does not possess a telos since, if it did, 
there would be a time when reality would come to a standstill.  And 
this is consistent with the Deep Ecology supporter’s interpretation. 
The weak point of their interpretation comes in connection with 
their understanding that Spinoza’s substance “does not hold any 
sort of preference towards its modifications or relative entities”. 
They interpret the substance as being totally  impartial because to 
ascribe partiality to the substance would be to anthropomorphize it.  
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The question here is: is conferring partiality to the substance 
ascribing it with human features?  The Deep Ecology supporter 
certainly  thinks so.  But one could still question this by referring to 
another two aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy.  The first aspect is 
that the substance is akin to an organism, and not to a mechanical 
apparatus since the substance manifests itself as both natura 
naturans or creator (i.e. the active force of nature) and natura 
naturata or creation (i.e. nature as produce).  The second aspect is 
that Spinoza defends an idealism-realism or a realism-idealism 
since the substance encompasses both thought and extension, 
subjectivity  and objectivity, which are irreducible attributes of the 
substance for Spinoza; and as such Spinoza is not merely 
defending some sort of realism or idealism as some commentators 
may have held in the past.
The implication of holding the substance as an organism, and of 
defending an idealism-realism or realism-idealism, are important 
here since the substance starts to share similarities with live and 
conscious organisms.  That is, the substance as an organism is 
alive, and because the substance also possesses the features of 
thought and extension, subjectivity and objectivity, this also implies 
that the substance possesses some sort of consciousness.  Thus, 
if the substance is understood as akin to some sort of conscious 
organism then it is possible to hold that the substance does hold 
some sort of preference towards some of its modes.  For instance, 
I, as an organism, do not care much for the bits of skin that fall from 
my body continuously, but I do care about my limbs and my vital 
organs.  In the same way, the substance may not care as much for 
its simpler modifications such as amoebas or slugs or viruses, but 
they may care more for a more developed mode or relative entity 
such as the human being.  
A possible reply by  the Deep Ecology supporter would be to 
propose that every entity is necessary in the chain of Being, that is, 
that without smaller entities such as amoebas or slugs or viruses 
that Nature’s development would come into a halt or be hindered. 
To argue this would be to give up on the notion that Nature has no 
telos, that things in nature just happen.  To argue that there is a 
necessary chain of Being is to argue that Nature is pursuing a 
particular developmental avenue and this contradicts Spinoza's 
views that Nature has no telos because if it did then when it 
reached its telos reality  would come into a halt.  The thesis of 
nature having no telos has to be undermined first, which is a 
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difficult thing to do.  The burden of proof here is with those who 
challenge this thesis.
Spinoza certainly never advocated such views openly (i.e. that the 
substance is conscious and that it may hold some sort of 
preference towards some of its modifications) but this reading is 
entailed and consistent with Spinoza’s system – in fact, there is a 
long history of interpreting Spinoza’s substance but this has been 
rejected by more modern commentators such as Curley  (1969).. 
However, interpreting the substance as akin to conscious organism 
may prove problematic for Deep Ecology because it  may just cast 
enough doubt on the Deep Ecology supporter’s thesis of intrinsic 
value and biocentric egalitarianism; this is so because if the 
substance holds some sort of preference towards some of its 
modes then some modes may be viewed differently  by the 
substance and this is damaging to intrinsic value (i.e. some entities 
may not have a value at all for the substance or absolute) and to 
biocentric egalitarianism (i.e. some entities are more valuable than 
others to the substance or absolute).  This may present a major 
problem to Deep  Ecology supporters, such as Naess, Devall, and 
Sessions since their views rely heavily on the issues of intrinsic 
value and biocentric egalitarianism, and as such this problem may 
render ineffective Deep Ecology’s call for a change in human 
attitudes towards live beings, ecosystems, the planet and the 
universe.  
A New Strategy for Deep Ecology  
Despite facing this challenge not all is lost to Deep Ecology.  Some 
of Spinoza’s views may still provide support to Deep Ecology, if a 
different strategy is pursued.  In general Deep Ecology supporters 
derive their views of self-realization from their views on the intrinsic 
value and biocentric egalitarianism.  It is perhaps worth quoting the 
following passage of Devall and Sessions (1985:67) again here:
The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in 
the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom 
and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding 
and self-realization within the larger Self-Realization. 
This basic intuition is that all organisms and entities in 
the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are 
equal in intrinsic value.
I have argued that there are some serious problems concerning the 
Deep Ecology’s views on intrinsic value and biocentric 
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egalitarianism.  However, I understand that it is possible to bypass 
or give up  on intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism and still 
hold on to the thesis of self-realization by referring solely  to 
Spinoza’s thesis of conatus and by also referring to the 
interconnectivity of all things since everything is a mode of the 
substance. 
Prima facie, Spinoza appears to be an ethical egoist, since he 
defends the view that one should pursue whatever would benefit 
one’s conatus, one’s pursuit of self-realization, one’s striving to 
endure for as long as one possibly  could.  For Spinoza, it is true 
that human beings are primarily egoistic beings because each 
individual human being wants to preserve his or her own life for as 
long as possible (and to do so he must consider the consequences 
of every action to himself, i.e. ethical egoism).  But in doing so, 
human beings realize that all other human beings are pursuing the 
same goal and in the same manner (cf. Lloyd 1996:74-76; Bennett 
1984:299-307).  This very fact, demonstrates that the best thing for 
a human being to do is to team up  with other human beings.  To do 
otherwise, would result in wars, violence and disputes, which would 
threaten, not enhance, one’s existence.  By working as a group, 
human beings are able to help  each other to endure for as long as 
they possibly could.  Therefore, that form of individualism that first 
strikes any commentator on Spinoza is fast replaced by a form of 
communitarian-ism once Spinoza’s system is truly understood (cf. 
Guilherme 2009: 128-133; Lloyd 1996:74-76; Bennett 
1984:299-307);.   It is worth quoting the following passages of 
Ethics:
4P31 - In so far as anything agrees with our nature, thus far it is 
necessarily good. 
4P35 - In so far as men live under the guidance of reason, thus far 
only they always necessarily agree in nature. 
4P36 - The greatest good of those who follow virtue (reason) is 
common to all, and all can equally enjoy it. (my brackets)
4P37 - The good which each one who follows virtue (reason) 
desires for himself, he also desires for other men, and the more so 
the more knowledge he has of God (Nature). (my brackets)
As it is quite clear, these four propositions are concerned with the 
relations between human beings and the conditions for a mutually 
beneficial and sustained intercourse in community life.  I quote 
Garrett (1997:227):
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Spinoza holds, as a general metaphysical thesis, that 
whenever two things "agree in nature" they will, to 
that extent, be mutually beneficial, since the nature 
that each strives to benefit is the same (E4P31). 
Human beings necessarily "agree in nature" to the 
extent that they are guided by reason (E4P35).  For 
human reason, as reason, is the same in all, and it 
aims at the same thing - namely, knowledge or 
understanding.  Understanding, moreover, is a good 
that can be shared by all without diminishing anyone's 
enjoyment of it (E4P36).  In fact, Spinoza holds, 
nothing is more useful to a human being than another 
human being who is guided by reason (E4P35c1). 
Hence, individuals who are virtuous, or guided by 
reason, will all seek, from their own self-interest, the 
same goods for others that they  seek for themselves 
(E4P37).  Indeed to the extent that if a community of 
human beings is guided by reason, its members can 
"compose, as i t were, one Mind and one 
Body"  (E4P18s) - that is, a complex individual, 
composed of like-minded human beings, that has its 
own endeavour of self-preservation.
Therefore, according to Spinoza, it is in a human being’s interest, 
who is guided by reason, to associate with other human beings, 
since all pursue the same goals.  That is, all human beings pursue 
self-knowledge and knowledge of the world in their attempt to live 
for as long as they  possibly  can.  The Deep Ecology supporter 
could hold on to this view.  They could argue that given that 
everything is interconnected, since everything is a mode of the 
substance, that it is in human being’s best interest to establish the 
same sort of ‘communitarian relationship’, not only with other 
human beings, but with the whole of existing entities, with all the 
other modes of the substance.  For instance, given that everything 
is interconnected, is it not problematic for human beings 
themselves if human beings destroy  a particular species or 
ecosystem?  Since everything is interconnected, if human beings 
do not establish a communitarian relation with the other entities, 
from the smallest modes to ecosystems, then there may be 
consequences that will come about due to such human behaviour. 
For instance, if an ecosystem is destroyed then its biodiverse 
richness is destroyed and with it the knowledge that it could yield, 
knowledge of animal species and animals’ behaviour, knowledge of 
plant species, not to mention, for instance, the knowledge of the 
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chemical compounds that these species could yield, compounds 
which could yield new and more effective medicines against human 
ailments for instance.  By linking the notions of interconnectivity 
and conatus which are found in Spinoza we can reach the 
conclusion that human beings should do their best to maintain 
equilibrium with all things because this is in their own interest.
It is interesting to note here that Spinoza has been criticised by 
commentators such as Bennett (1984:299-307) for defending 
egoism and for presuming a successful reconciliation in a form of 
ethical communitarianism; however, Lloyd (1996:75-76) asserts 
that:
Spinoza’s ensuing discussion throughout Part Three, 
however, shows that he is well aware of the 
inevitability  of conflict between human beings.  To 
present his attempted reconciliation between egoism 
and collaborative morality as based on ‘an 
indefensible doctrine of harmony through similarity’ is 
to miss the dynamic character of Spinoza’s striving 
for self-preservation.  Bennett is too restrictive...in his 
interpretation...Spinoza’s point is not that an 
individual necessarily pursues its own interests rather 
than theirs.  It is rather that what it is to be an 
individual is to be both determined to act through the 
mediation of other modes and likewise to determine 
others.  The fluctuations between acting and being 
acted upon provide a spectrum along which each 
individual will experience passions and their 
transformation in ethical life.  
It is arguable that this position offers an alternative to the position 
argued for by most Deep Ecology supporters because it calls for a 
change in human attitude but it does not do away with human 
discretion for action.  For instance, when faced with the dilemma of 
destroying an ecosystem for harvesting its wood, the human being 
will have to ponder whether it is worth destroying that particular 
environment for that purpose or whether it is more beneficial to 
harvest the wood somewhere else or even to replace the wood by 
another material; or when faced with the opportunity of killing a 
virus and saving the human host, let us say small pox, the human 
being will be able to decide for the human life with no qualms for 
the human life is a higher modification of the substance (within the 
reading that the substance holding a preference for its higher 
modifications) or simply because the human being’s conatus calls 
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for it, the human being’s striving for enduring for as long as it 
possibly could demands it.  This outcome should appease those 
who are suspicious of views based on intrinsic value and biological 
egalitarianism for their high demands on human behaviour.   
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